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Comment

The Proposed Fairness in Disclosure of
Evidence Act of 2012: More Cons than Pros
with Proposed Disclosure Requirements in
Federal Criminal Cases*

3.8
The proposed Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012 (the Act)
is a proposal of uniform standards for disclosing evidence in federal
criminal cases that was introduced on March 15, 2012 by Senator Lisa
Murkowski of Alaska.' The Act's stated purpose is: "To require the
attorney for the Government to disclose favorable information to the
defendant in criminal prosecutions brought by the United States, and for
I.

INTRODUCTION: BRADY, THE ACT, AND MODEL RULE

* The Author would like to thank Professor James P. Fleissner for his guidance in each
stage of developing this Comment.
1. Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s2197 (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
The bill also has five co-sponsors: Daniel Akaka (Democrat) of Hawaii, Mark Begisch
(Democrat) of Alaska, Kay Hutchinson (Republican) of Texas, Daniel Inouye (Democrat) of
Hawaii, and Michael Enzi (Republican) of Wyoming.
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other purposes."2 Particularly, the Act would amend Chapter 201 of
title 18 of the United States Code by adding the text that is discussed
below.'
On June 5, 2012, Thomas M. Susman, ABA Director of the Government Affairs Office, wrote a letter to the Honorable Patrick Leahy,
Chairman of the Congressional Committee on the Judiciary, as well as
the Honorable Charles Grassley, a ranking member in the Committee on
the Judiciary, commending the scheduling of a hearing regarding the
topics that the proposed legislation addresses.4 Susman described the
problem that the Act addresses as, "the disturbing issue of federal
prosecutors' failure to meet their constitutional obligations to provide
accused persons and entities with important information critical to their
ability to defend themselves."5 Susman then directly addressed how
Brady v. Maryland6 has shaped federal criminal law since 1963.'
Brady stated the constitutional reasoning for the duty of prosecutors
to disclose evidence to opposing counsel, finding "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."8
Then in Giglio v. United States9 in 1972, the Court clarified that the
duty to disclose is not limited only to exculpatory evidence, but also
covers evidence "affecting credibility."" Following that decision, in
United States v. Agurs, n the Court held this duty is not only in place
when a defendant requests the pertinent evidence, but all the time.12
The Comment below addresses the shortcomings of this Act by
analyzing both the arguments for and against it. A bill to prevent
prosecutorial misconduct is one that is easy to support and difficult to
oppose, for obvious reasons. As explained below, those who reject
supporting the Act do not do so because they encourage or endorse

2. S. 2197, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012).
3. Id.§2.
4. Letter from Thomas M. Susman, ABA Director of the Government Affairs Office,
to the Honorable Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the congressional Committee on the
Judiciary, as well as the Honorable Charles Grassley, member in the Committee on the
Judiciary (June 5, 2012), availableat http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/ GAO/2012jun5_discoveryobligations l.authcheckdam.pdf.
5. Id.
6. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
7. Susman, supra note 4.
8. 373 U.S. at 87.
9. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
10. Id. at 154.
11. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
12. Id. at 107.
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wrongful convictions. Instead, the rejection of the proposal comes from
its rushed and reactionary requirements that undermine firmlyestablished precedent regarding discovery obligations.
The proposal not only dramatically changes the materiality standard
for exculpatory evidence, it also imputes knowledge to prosecutors that
creates an investigative duty for offices that will be impossible to comply
with. Further, it requires that prosecutors prove beyond a reasonable
doubt-a reverse-standard of proof to that of the conviction burden they
already carry-that they have produced such exculpatory evidence.
13
Under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 (Rule 3.8), prosecu14 The rule provides in
tors have to turn over all exculpatory evidence.
comment 1, "A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice
and not simply that of an advocate." 5 The comment continues, "[tihis
responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the
defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the
basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to
prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons." 6
However, what Rule 3.8 does not include is an imputation of knowledge on the prosecutor. This is a standard that will be further discussed
below, but one that the Author believes to be unworkable. Further,
under the proposal, there is a broad duty to turn over any exculpatory
information, and if prosecutors fail to do so, they must show that their
failure was, beyond a reasonable doubt, harmless to the defendant. 7
This implicit "criminalizing" of prosecutors' misconduct isone that the
Author considers to be a far overshoot of what is necessary to prevent
prosecutorial misconduct. Further, it is unnecessary considering the
materiality standard already in place which institutes a standard that
has proved to be both workable by prosecutors and which sets a
reasonable burden for showing the information not turned over would
not have harmed the defendant. This standard will be further discussed
below.
There are other problems with the Act that step outside of the
reasonable bounds that Rule 3.8 delineates for prosecutors. The Act
creates a duty to investigate-if one reads the Act literally it says that
prosecutors have a duty to turn over everything exculpatory that is in
possession of, or could, in due diligence, be found for the defendant.'"

13.

MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2012).

14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id. at cmt. 1.
Id.
S. 2197 § 2.
Id.

18.
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This language creates an investigative function for the prosecutor that
would traditionally be defense counsel's job.
Not only is the prosecutor, under the proposal, required to look for
evidence that the defendant committed the crime, but also any evidence
that could be exculpatory that he did not commit the crime--not just
evidence that is material, but any evidence. 9 This shift creates an
unworkable standard because now, defense counsel, if they are acting
with due diligence, will be required to check up and make sure the
prosecutor (and prosecutorial team) is investigating exculpatory
information as well-and turning over that information immediately.

II. HISTORY OF PROSECUTORIAL DIscOvERY COMPLIANCE
All prosecutors have the heavy burden of ensuring justice in their
pursuit of convictions of those guilty of a crime. While preparing and
presenting a case, a prosecutor could easily become aware of information
that could help the defendant.20 That information can oftentimes be in
the prosecutor's files before either the defendant or defense counsel even
knows that it exists. 21 The government often has both more and betterquality resources, as well as law-enforcement, and through the nature
of its policies and procedures, the government also has very early access
to "critical evidence."22 Some examples are:
a prosecutor might discover a police report of an interview with an
eyewitness who stated that the defendant was not the perpetrator of
the robbery; the police might tell the prosecutor that one of his key
witnesses recently failed a lie detector test and then partially recanted
his story; a prosecutor might learn that a laboratory test failed to link
the defendant to the murder weapon and items of clothing worn by the
killer; or a prosecutor at trial might hear his main witness embellish
his testimony to such an extent that he is committing perjury.'
Further, the assumption is that in these examples, the prosecutor
believes wholeheartedly in the accused's guilt, and has significant
evidence to support that belief. 4 The prosecutor has an interest and
a duty in protecting the community by securing a conviction.2 The
duty to disclose any evidence to a defendant that is favorable to his case

19. Id.

20.

BENNEnT L. GERSHmAN,PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.

25. Id.

§

5:1 (2d ed. 2012).
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26
"raises difficult legal and ethical questions." Obviously, a prosecutor
does not have to share his whole file with a defendant, nor his strategies
for prosecuting."
Still, a prosecutor is more than just a zealous advocate for his
"cient"-he represents a government that is committed to "ensur[ing]
that justice is done under fair and civilized rules."" Also, failure to
disclose favorable evidence is a serious violation of ethical rules that can
lead to a horrible miscarriage of justice, especially in convicting the
innocent or forcing guilty pleas that may not have occurred but for the
withholding of evidence.29
The Supreme Court has outlined rules governing this duty. The rules
are often grouped as "Brady" rules, after the landmark case, Brady v.
0
Brady rules apply when "a prosecutor has failed to
Maryland."
disclose to a defendant convicted of a crime favorable evidence, has
solicited false testimony, or allowed false testimony to go uncorrected."3 ' This Comment discusses how recent proposed legislation aims
to regulate a prosecutor's duty to assist a defendant in obtaining
exculpatory evidence, including both the benefits and the shortcomings
of that regulation.
Kyles v. Whitley 2 explains how prosecutors are responsible for
finding the material exculpatory information in the hands of the
police.33 The Court explained that, "[w]hile the definition of Bagley
materiality in terms of the cumulative effect of suppression must
accordingly be seen as leaving the government with a degree of
discretion, it must also be understood as imposing a corresponding
burden." 4 This burden is one that prosecutors' policies and procedures
have been developed around.3 5 Kyles continues,

On the one side, showing that the prosecution knew of an item of
favorable evidence unknown to the defense does not amount to a Brady
violation, without more. But the prosecution, which alone can know
what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

30. Id.; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
31. GERSHMAN, supra, note 20, § 5.1.
32. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).

33. Id. at 421.
34. Id. at 437.
35. Id. at 437-38.

728

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure
when the point of "reasonable probability" is reached.3 6
Under this system, the traditional balance between the prosecutor and
defense counsel is preserved. Justice Souter continues,
[tihis in turn means that the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn
of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. But whether the
prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation (whether, that
is, a failure to disclose is in good faith or bad faith, see Brady, 373
U.S., at 87, 83 S.Ct., at 1196-1197), the prosecution's responsibility for
failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material level
of importance is inescapable.37
The opinion here elucidates the burden of prosecutors' responsibility.
The Act creates an impossible burden with the extension of the scope of
the agencies the prosecutor is required to investigate. The "prosecutorial
team" extends to agencies that the prosecutors work with, creating a
literally impossible burden to meet when the imputation of knowledge
is combined with the scope of the team. 8
This Comment, above all, aims to generate discussion from a neutral
vantage point. Below are arguments both in favor of and in opposition
to the Act. Both sides emphasize their vantage point largely due to the
associations they represent. That said, it is important that this analysis
start from an empirical analysis of the problem of prosecutorial
misconduct. Several intrinsic empirical obstacles prevent an accurate
assessment of how widespread prosecutorial misconduct in the United
States is.3 9 Obviously, anyone who willfully breaks the rules does not
want to be found out and thus would likely take steps to "conceal their
misdeeds." 0 Further, "[elven a scrupulous prosecutor who witnesses a
colleague engage in misconduct may [not] report it for fear of professional repercussions."4 '

Another important consideration is the autonomy of prosecutors'
offices in creating their own policies, and even though "judicial oversight
should theoretically check this autonomy, courts are generally loath to

36. Id. at 438.
37. Id. at 437-38.
38. S. 2197 § 2.
39. David Keenan, Deborah Jane Cooper, David Lebowitz, Tamar Lerer, The Myth of
Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional
Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against ProsecutorialMisconduct, 121 YALE
L.J.
ONLINE 203, 209-13 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/1O/25Keenan.html.
40. Id. at 209.
41. Id. at 209-10.

DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE ACT

2013]

729

interfere with the inner workings of a coordinate branch of govern42
ment[,]" and rightly so based on the role of the judiciary. Individual
prosecutors also have very broad discretion when deciding who will be
prosecuted and with what charges.4" One article notes, "[p]retrial
hearings ostensibly exist to cabin these powers but in practice rarely
Because of this seemingly
operate as an effective safeguard. '
"insulated" set-up, misconduct can slip by undeterred.
So how much misconduct is out there? One article points out that "the
vast majority of known instances of prosecutorial misconduct come to
light only during the course of a drawn-out trial or appellate proceeding." 5 Further, since most criminal cases "plea out," there is little
investigation into the processes followed by prosecutors, and thus little
exposure of misconduct. One of the most problematic reasons that could
explain prosecutorial misconduct is that "those in the best position to
report misconduct-namely judges, other prosecutors, and defense
attorneys and their clients-are often disincentivized from doing so for
both strategic and political reasons."" The only one who would have
an interest in doing so has very little incentive in creating an even
greater adversary as one judge explains: "[It is unreasonable] to expect
a defendant to risk a prosecutor's actual or imagined displeasure by
instituting proceedings that cannot directly benefit him. The defendant
may not unreasonably believe such action will adversely affect his case
in subsequent proceedings ...

or his later chances for parole."'

The evidence we do have shows that prosecutorial misconduct is a
grave problem.48 One study found, for instance, over two thousand
appellate cases in the last four decades where prosecutorial misconduct
made for dismissals, sentence reductions, or reversals.4 9 Another study
of capital convictions in America from 1973 to 1995 found evidence of
either the defendant's innocence or favorable evidence to negate the
death penalty was withheld in one in six cases where the conviction was
reversed. 50
Some argue that these statistics "significantly underreport" the width
and depth of prosecutorial misconduct, not only because of empirical
obstacles, but also of the "harmless error" standard courts utilize upon
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

210.

211.
211-12.
211.
211-12.
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review of criminal convictions.5 1 For a reversal, a defendant "must not
only prove misconduct, but must also show that the misconduct
substantially prejudiced the outcome of his or her trial."52 So, with this
standard, courts can hedge the difficult finding by simply deeming the
error harmless, even if it is proven.5 3 One article notes: "[k]nowing
that 'minor' misconduct is unlikely to jeopardize a conviction on appeal,
prosecutors may be more likely to bend the rules in the pursuit of
54
victory."

This Comment will address the obstacles that the proposed Fairness
in Disclosure of Evidence Act meets and, debatably, fails to overcome.
It will detail the benefits and arguably overwhelming burdens that the
Act creates through its over-creation of duties for individual prosecutors.
It will explain how the Act fails to take into account the benefits of
locally-operated prosecutors' offices that can manage prosecutors on a
more familiar level, while placing burdens on prosecutors that are
difficult to shoulder. Though clearly there needs to be some reform of
policies, especially since the Stevens case has been consuming headlines,
this reactionary suggestion will create more problems than solutions for
prosecutors and the communities they protect.
III.

THE PROPOSED FAIRNESS IN EVIDENCE DISCLOSURE ACT

A.

The Text
The "Official Summary" on GovTrack, an online source for tracking the
progress of bills, summarizes the text of the Act as such:
Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012 - Amends the federal
criminal code to require the attorney for the government, in a criminal
prosecution, to provide to the defendant any information or evidence
that may reasonably appear to be favorable to the defendant regarding
the determination of guilt, any preliminary matter before the cour[t],
or the sentence to be imposed (covered information):
(1)that is within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecution
team; or
(2) the existence of which is known, or through due diligence would
become known, to that attorney.
Directs the government attorney to provide to the defendant any
covered information:

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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(1) without delay after arraignment and before the entry of any guilty
plea; and
(2) as soon as is reasonably practicable upon its becoming known,
without regard to whether the defendant has entered or agreed to
enter a guilty plea.
Authorizes the court, upon motion of the United States which the court
may permit to be filed under seal to protect a witness's identity, to
issue an order to protect against immediate disclosure if:
(1) the covered information is favorable to the defendant solely because
it would provide a basis to impeach the credibility of a potential
witness, and
(2) the United States establishes a reasonable basis to believe that the
identity of the potential witness is not already known to any defendant
and disclosure would present a threat to anyone's safety.
Permits the court, under specified circumstances, to accept a waiver of
this Act by a defendant.
Prohibits a defendant from waiving a provision of this Act except in
open court.
Requires the court to order an appropriate remedy upon determining
that the United States has violated the requirement to disclose or to
disclose in a timely manner and provides for payment of the defendant's costs.55
In order to fully examine the Act, an analysis of the proposed Act's
relevant sections are included below. Section 2, "Duty to Disclose
Favorable Information" adds to Chapter 201 of title 18 of the United
These include the term "covered
States Code several definitions.
information," which is defined as:
information, data, documents, evidence, or objects that may reasonably
appear to be favorable to the defendant in a criminal prosecution
brought by the United States with respect to (A) the determination of
guilt; (B) any preliminary matter before the court before which the
criminal prosecution is pending; or (C) the sentence to be imposed.5"
This section also includes who is under this duty by defining the
"prosecution team" as:
(A) the Executive agency.., that brings the criminal prosecution on
behalf of the United States; and (B) any entity or individual, including

55. LiBRARY OF CONGRESS SUMMARY, S. 2197 (112th): Fairness in Disclosure of
Evidence Act of 2012 (2012), availableat www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s2197#sum
mary/libraryofcongress. The summary was written by the Congressional Research Service,
a nonpartisan arm of the Library of Congress; GovTrack did not write the summary.
56. Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S.2197 § 2, 112th Cong. (2d Sess.
2012).
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a law enforcement agency or official, that--(i) acts on behalf of the
United States with respect to the criminal prosecution; (ii) acts under
the control of the United States with respect to the criminal prosecution; or (iii) participates, jointly with the Executive agency described in
subparagraph (A), in any investigation with respect to the criminal
prosecution. 7
The definitions define the duty itself, clearly one of the most important
terms, as follows:
In a criminal prosecution brought by the United States, the attorney
for the Government shall provide to the defendant any covered
information-(1) that is within the possession, custody, or control of the
prosecution team; or (2) the existence of which is known, or by the
exercise of due diligence would become known, to the attorney for the
Government.58
One of the most crucial determinations is when this information would
have to be turned over, which can be found in the definition of timing,
which must be:
(1) without delay after arraignment and before the entry of any guilty
plea; and (2) if the existence of the covered information is not known
on the date of the initial disclosure under this subsection, as soon as
is reasonably practicable upon the existence of the covered information
becoming known, without regard to whether the defendant has entered
or agreed to enter a guilty plea. 59
B. The ABA and Other Supporters of the Act
The variety of policies was the greatest reason for formulating the Act
as written. As Susman discussed in the ABA letter to the Congressional

Judicial Committee:
[F]ederal legislation is needed to implement Brady disclosure duties.
After a decade of controversial and highly publicized cases, the
response by DOJ through a succession of studies and formulation of
internal guidance memoranda has not resulted in a uniform practice
as to the timing or scope of Brady and Giglio disclosures by federal
6
prosecutors. 0

Susman explains that the "wildly different policies" are the problem and
that there is "no reason why the DOJ should have 97 different policies

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. § 2.
Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
Id. § 2.
Susman, supra note 4.
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rather than one uniform policy." 1 One example is that some United
States Attorney Offices provide FBI interview forms and interview
memoranda of witnesses routinely to comply with disclosure duties while
other United States Attorney Offices regularly do not. Susman makes
this argument, but does not explain why the variations are necessarily
harmful. In fact, localized attention to when disclosure is necessary on
a case-by-case basis may be an important efficiency and thoroughness
strategy for USAO offices.
One article, "Justice After Senator Stevens," explains the problems
that have spurred the Act by explaining the highly-publicized prosecutorial misconduct in Senator Steven's trial.6 2 It alleges that "[tihe
Department of Justice has acknowledged pervasive prosecutorial
misconduct in the corruption trial of the late Senator Ted Stevens. It
needs to take an even closer look at the powers and responsibilities of its
prosecutors, after a scathing new report on the case by a court-appointed
investigator."'6
At Senator Stevens's trial in 2008, evidence was
concealed that had the potential to damage the testimony and credibility
of the federal prosecutors' most important witness.64 Henry Scheulke,
special counsel, conducted an investigation that took over two years and
summarized his findings in March of 2012.5 Stevens was found guilty
of lying to hide gifts relating to home-renovation and lost a re-election
bid narrowly only a few days later.6 6 Though the verdict was set aside
before Stevens died in a plane crash in 2010, the prosecutorial misconduct in that case raised several red flags that have spurred on the
attempted reform behind this Act. 7
Among the misconduct described in the report is that "the prosecuting
team went unsupervised, withheld documents and never conducted a
review for exculpatory evidence. Their 'complete, simultaneous and longterm memory failure' concerning a crucial witness with information
backing the senator's claim of innocence was 'astonishing,"' according to
Schuelke.6 8 But Schuelke concluded that "contempt charges against

61. Id.
62. JusticeAfter Senator Stevens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2012, http'/www.nytimes.con/2012/03/19/opinionjustice-after-senator-stevens.html?_r=O.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Report to Hon. Emmett G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the
Court's Order, dated Apr. 7, 2012, In re Special Proceedings, No. 1:09-mc-00198-EGS
(D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2012), availableat http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/Stevens-report.pdf
[hereinafter Schuelke Report].
66. JusticeAfter Senator Stevens, supra note 62.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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team members-not all were found at fault-were not feasible because
they did not receive an explicit reminder from a judge of their obligation
to disclose evidence helpful to the defense." 9 Since this investigation,
the Justice Department has increased training prosecutors on policy
regarding exculpatory evidence. That said, they still have the discretion
to decide what is "material."7 °
An ABA letter commending Senator Lisa Murkowski for her efforts is
a good example of the arguments in favor of the Act.7 The President
of the ABA wrote, "We strongly support the proposed Act and believe its
enactment will be an important step toward achieving consistency and
improving fairness in the federal criminal justice system and will serve
the cause of achieving justice in countless individual cases."72 The
reasoning, though, assumes that prosecutors are not able to be impartial
in their evaluation of the materiality of evidence: "[in] the federal
criminal system, the government often has control over the ability of the
defense to obtain evidence it needs to try its case. Specifically, the
government is required to assess whether evidence is exculpatory and to
disclose that information to the defense."73 Once information is deemed
"exculpatory," its disclosure is crucial to protecting the defendant's Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights.74 The ABA has several standards
attempting to regulate conduct in criminal trials; The Standards for
Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function "set out guidance for implementing Brady duties at Standard 3-3.11, Disclosure of Evidence by the
Prosecutor, as does Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of Professional
75
Conduct, prepared by the ABA."
Without a clear definition of what Brady material is, prosecutors
inevitably use many varying decision-making practices about what
materials are favorable to defendants, and thus what should be
disclosed. 6 The ABA describes this practice as "confusing," stating
that "[e]ven rare violations of Brady are intolerable," because criminal
convictions are too weighty for the occasional mistake.77

69. Id.

70. Id.
71. Letter from Win. T. (Bill) Robinson III to the Honorable Lisa Murkowski, United
States Senator (Mar. 15, 2012), availableat httpJAvww.americanbar.orgtcontentdam/aba/

uncategorized/GAO/2012Marchl5_EvidenceDisclosure-l.authcheckdam.pdf.
Jan. 26, 2013).
72. Robinson, supra note 71.
73. Id.
74. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
75. Robinson, supra note 71.
76. Id.
77. Id.

(last visited
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There are several other arguments in support of the proposal. The Act
clarifies the timing of Brady disclosures, for example."v One author
explains,
Whereas the law currently allows the government to provide Brady
disclosures essentially any time it wants before trial (with the ...
limitation that it must be provided within a reasonable time for the
disclosure of such
defense to use it at trial), the Act requires the
79
information "without delay after arraignment."
The proposal would also require the information be handed over before
This would make it more likely that
any guilty pleas are entered.'
more parts of the case are known before a defendant decides to plead
guilty.81 Further, the current Jencks Act 82 allows prosecutors to hold
information that is contained in witness statements until after a witness
testifies-this Act requires that this same information (if it is favorable
to the defense) be produced.'
One of the greatest strengths of the Act is the definition of what it
means for evidence to be in the "possession" of the government as far as
TM
its discoverability.
Federal criminal cases often raise this contention
regarding the denial of the government based on denying possession,
"while the defense seeks to impute to the prosecution possession of an
item by any part of the government."85 The Act includes government
agencies that participate in any investigation as within the definition of
the prosecution.8s The Act also includes disclosing items prosecutors
either know about or should know about; which effectively means that
prosecutors should not be able to avoid disclosure by avoiding knowledge
of certain parts of the investigation. 7
Specifically, the Act attempts to solve the "materiality" issue, which
has divided so many courts asking the question about the importance of
certain evidence before trial. Courts are currently applying a post-trial
evaluation method by asking "would the information at issue have made

78. Matthew Umhofer, Fairnessin Disclosureof Evidence Act: The good and the bad,
(Apr. 23, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/Insight/2012/04-April
/Fairness_in_Disclosure of_EvidenceActThe-good andthebad/.
79. Id.

80. S. 2197 § (2).
81. Umhofer, supra note 78.

82.

18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012).

83.

Umhofer, supra note 78.

84. S. 2197 § 2.
85. Umhofer, supra note 78.

86. Id.
87. Id.
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a difference in the trial result?"' Matthew Umhofer argues that under
this standard, prosecutors are able to withhold more because they can
make a good-faith argument that they did not think that a particular
piece of evidence would influence the jury. 9 Though this is much
cleaner, the argument for simply necessitating a better rule of law often
fails depending upon the situation being evaluated. 90 Instead, a brightline rule is instituted, requiring prosecutors to turn over any favorable
information related to guilt or sentencing.
Some argue that the Act also deals with admissibility well.9'
Currently, inadmissible evidence has not been covered under the Brady
standard, according to the Supreme Court.92 This means inadmissible

but favorable evidence could be withheld because prosecutors did not
think the evidence would be able to be presented at trial. The Act does
not include these limits, taking the discretion of its admissibility out of
the prosecutor's hands. Further, the Act includes remedies for failures
to disclose favorable evidence which include: (1) a new trial being
ordered; (2) dismissal without prejudice; and, (3) enabling a defendant
to recover costs when discovery violations are successfully exposed
through litigation. 3 There is also a prohibition at the appellate level
of a court finding a disclosure error "harmless" unless the "United States
demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict obtained."94
One blog from the Southern District of Florida calls the proposed
legislation "entirely non-controversial

...

[with] support of both

Democrats and Republicans." ' It goes on to say, "[olne problem-[the
Department of Justice] will oppose the bill. And for no good reason
except that it doesn't want to have to turn over favorable information if
[it's] not material."9'
David Oscar Markus, the writer for the blog,

denotes Senator Murkowski's explanation of why the Act is needed:
It is the solemn responsibility of federal prosecutors to secure justice-not simply convictions. It is the responsibility of the government
to prove an individual's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. See infra Subsection C.
91. Umhofer, supra note 78.
92. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
93. Umhofer, supra note 78.
94.

S. 2197 § 2.

95. David Oscar Markus, The Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act, SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF FLORIDA BLOG (Mar. 15, 2012), http://sdfla.blogspot.com/2012/03/fairness-indisclosure-of-evidence-act.html.

96. Id.
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government cannot, it is expected to voluntarily abandon the case. To
keep Americans' faith in the system we must raise the standards for
government prosecutors and cut the chances that we will. see the same
"hide the ball" tactics Sen. Stevens faced. 7
Senator Murkowski goes on,
Enough is enough. When his conviction was overturned, Sen. Stevens
said, "What some members of the prosecution team did nearly
destroyed my faith." Ted Stevens was a life-long public servant. He
and all Americans deserve to have full faith in the judicial system in
this country. We cannot allow the government to have a finger on the
scales ofjustice. My bill will ensure that another legacy of the Alaskan
of the 20th Century is fairness and justice for the centuries ahead."
Kirsten Schimpff argues that the Act substantially changes the Jencks
Act by requiring initial disclosure of all "favorable information,
'notwithstanding the Jencks Act."' 99 Schimpff notes how similar the
Act is to the text of Formal Opinion 09-454, but the Act directly
addresses the Jencks Act.0 0 The Act actually says that favorable
information should be disclosed "as soon as is reasonably practicable
upon the existence of the ... information becoming known ... [,]
notwithstanding [the Jencks Act] or any other provision of law," while
Formal Opinion 09-454 interprets Model Rule 3.8(d) as requiring such
disclosure "as soon as reasonably practical ... once known to the
prosecutor." 01
Further, the release of the over-500 page Schuelke Report motivates
many to support the Act. Before it was released, one judge wrote, "the
public cannot monitor the misconduct in the Stevens case without access
to the results of Mr. Schuelke's investigation, which are detailed in his
five-hundred-page Report." 2 That Report, which was released on
March 15, 2009, details "pervasive" Brady violations.01 3 The duty that,
as a result, was proposed by Senator Murkowski, will be "a continuing

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Kirsten M. Schimpff, Rule 3.8, the Jencks Act, and How the ABA Createda Conflict
Between Ethics and the Law on ProsecutorialDisclosure, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1729, 1779-80
n. 277 (2012); see also S. 2197 § 2.
100. Schimpff, supra note 99, at 1779 n.277.
101. Id.; see also S. 2197 § 2.
102. Schuelke Report, supra note 65, at 54.
103. Id. at 4.
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duty, subject to reasonable and limited exceptions for classified
information and fully litigable applications for protective orders."'0 4
There is also an argument for the Act because it will allow for
discretion among the courts to develop remedies for violations of the
duty, including the "harmless error" rejection unless proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, as previously discussed.' 5 The appellate burdenshifting makes prosecutors less likely to risk that an appellate court will
find beyond a reasonable doubt that their decision to withhold was
harmless.10'6 There is also a hypothesis that the Act "may provide
strong impetus to a national discovery reform effort on the state level,"
encouraging prosecutors at the state level to conform to the same
disclosure duties, and state legislators to work on a similar bill.10'
Supporters of the Act argue that "[n] o one should have any illusion as
to the difficulty of securing eventual passage. [The Department of
Justice] will likely resist with all its might. But in this case, might does
not necessarily make right."' 8 For supporters of the Act, the more
they can emphasize (and in some opinions, inflate) Brady violations, the
greater support there should be of the Act. Norman Reimer writes,
"[t]he many examples of abuse should overcome government resistance.
[The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers] will [help] to
secure this important reform, and the Association will need the help of
every member and every person throughout the profession who cares
about justice in the nation's criminal courts."'0 9
What does the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL) have to say about the Act other than encouraging its passage?
A press release from March 15, 2012 on their website explains the Act
as "nonpartisan" and "empowering" of prosecutors."0 The NACDL is
obviously an organization dedicated to criminal defense work and thus
has one of the most biased opinions in support of the Act."' The

104. Lindsay Erickson, The Failed Prosecutionof Former United States Senator from
Alaska, Ten Stevens, PUBLIC LEGAL DECISIONS, Spring 2012, at 9.
105. Id.; see also S. 2197 § 2.
106. Norman L. Reimer, Discovery Reform: The Time for Action is at Hand, CHAMPION,
Mar. 2005.
107. Id.
108. Id. The Author does not describe how this "might" will affect the passage of the
Act.
109. Id.
110. Press Release, NACDL Applauds Sensible, Bipartisan Discover Reform Legislation
Introduced Today in the United States Senate (Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://www.
nacdl.org/NewsReleases.aspx?id=23792.
111. See the NACDL's mission statement, listed on the bottom of their website:
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legislation is described as "bipartisan legislation" which intends to "bring
about sensible discovery reform in criminal prosecutions." 2 The
NACDL's president, Lisa Monet Wayne, details the rights secured in
Brady as "often [] misunderstood or ignored.""' She continues, "Even
well-intentioned prosecutors lack the clear statutory guidance necessary
to ensure the full and prompt disclosure to the defense of favorable
evidence.""' She goes on to explain that disclosure problems create
unjust results in prosecutions and presumably wrongful convictions, and
that this legislation will "fix[] that problem.""' She describes that if
passed, the Act would be "a giant step" in improving how fair and
accurate federal criminal prosecutions are." 6 She goes on117to explain
that the Act "will empower prosecutors across the country."
The press release references a Capitol Hill news conference that, as
President Wayne argues, "reflect[ed] the broad-based support for the
legislation.""' Proposing Senator Murkowski and Senator Kay Bailey
Hutchison of Texas detailed the Stevens case in order to explain the
"need for reform and uniform standard."" 9 One telling quote regarding the case was from Rob Cary, a member of NACDL's White Collar
Crime Committee, as well as counsel to the late Senator Stevens: "No
amount of reform can guarantee that prosecutors will not lie and cheat
as they did in his case, but this legislation today would go a long way
towards making it much less likely . . . in the future." ° The power
that the government has in prosecuting criminals should not be
considered "a game[;] [iut is not hunt. It is not sport. It's about justice

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers is the preeminent organization
advancing the mission of the criminal defense bar to ensure justice and due process
for persons accused of crime or wrongdoing. A professional bar association founded in
1958, NACDL's approximately 10,000 direct members in 28 countries - and 90 state,
provincial and local affiliate organizations totaling up to 40,000 attorneys - include
private criminal defense lawyers, public defenders, military defense counsel, law
professors and judges committed to preserving fairness and promoting a rational and
humane criminal justice system.
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112.
113.
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115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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and fairness[,]" according to NACDL Executive Director Norman L.
Reimer.'
The ACLU is an additional supporter of the Act. Michael Macleod-Ball,
Chief of Staff of the ACLU's Washington Legislative Office, explained
their position as, "[thinking that this] bill supports the principle that
justice demands and depends on fairness," and adding that the Act "is
intended to help ensure that our criminal courts mete out justice and not
merely convictions." 22 The NACDL press release goes on to detail
that the Act is also supported by the Constitution Project and the
Institute for Legal Reform at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, among
123
other support.

C. The Act's Downfalls
Commentators have discussed several notable problems with the Act
as it is proposed." 2 As Matthew Umhofer for Thomson Reuters News
& Insight notes, "First, the Act fails to include sanctions against an
offending prosecutor as an express remedy."" 2 That said, the Act does
allow courts to administer other remedies it determines to be appropriate.'26 One of the most crucial questions that the Act brings forth is
whether prosecutors deserve sanctions when "anything goes wrong with
their cases," whether those things are within or outside of the prosecutors' control. 27 However, it is quite clear that when a prosecutor acts
against a defendant's constitutional rights recklessly or intentionally the
prosecutor should certainly be sanctioned.12 ' The Act does not make
the differences in this kind of conduct clear and instead holds prosecutors, in a blanketed fashion, responsible for the acts of governmental
organizations that they have limited control over. It is certainly true
that "[plersonal prosecutorial accountability is wholly consistent with,
and indeed will likely enhance, our system of justice. " 129 Furthermore,
the Act contains a list of several factors that should be considered, but
crucially leaves out two very important factors: (1) instances of past
misconduct and (2) deterrence.' 30 One author notes that the Act
"problematically narrows the scope of the remedy to a particular case,
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Unihofer, supra note 78.

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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when repeated misconduct in other cases may point to a larger problem
and may warrant consideration in developing a [more] meaningful
remedy."'' This is especially relevant because repeated instances of
prosecutorial misconduct are often the most egregious.
For example, in 2009 one judge from the District Court of Massachusetts pointed to the "persistent recurrence of inadvertent violations of
defendants' constitutional right to discovery in the District of Massachusetts," concluding that he could not trust Justice Department training
because it was failing to ensure the protection of defendants' discovery
rights." 2 That judge started his own training program on criminal
discovery processes.' Matthew Umhofer argues that the Department
of Justice regularly requests courts to consider deterrence as a factor
when sentences for criminal conduct are made, so the courts should thus
consider deterrence of prosecutorial misconduct in the same way. 134
Also, the Act hones in on evidence that the prosecution considers
"favorable" to the defendant, but not evidence that is "material to guilt
or punishment."'
Thus, the Act, as written, allows prosecutors to
delay producing items that it decides are "relevant" but not favorable. 36 One of the fundamental issues in deeming evidence "favorable" or just "relevant" is that only the defense would truly know what
" 13
evidence would be favorable to it; "the prosecution is just guessing. 1
Federal courts' recognition of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16
emphasizes that having information can lead either party to other
information because the rule requires disclosure of information that
"will play an important role in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding
witness preparation, corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment
or rebuttal."'3 8 This limitation in the Act could prevent the defendant
from immediate access to evidence that the prosecutor may not deem
favorable, but only relevant."'
The Department of Justice's position on the Fairness in Disclosure of
Evidence Act of 2012 is that Congress should not pass this Act as it is
currently drafted. The Deputy Attorney General has several arguments
in support of rejecting the Act, one of which is that it could endanger

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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Id.

137. Id.
138. Id.; see also FFD. R. CRIM.P. 16.
139. Umhofer, supra note 78.
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Government witnesses' lives. 40 Because of this fear, the witness's
information section of the Act was removed, the Conference Report
explaining,
[A] majority of the Conferees believe it is not in the interest of the
effective administration of criminal justice to require that the government or the defendant be forced to reveal the names and addresses of
its witnesses before trial. Discouragement of witnesses and improper
contact directed at influencing their testimony, were deemed paramount concerns in the formulation of this policy.''
Other facets of the Department of Justice have thoroughly explained
their perspective on the harms of the Act and how the Act itself is
motivated by fear, not facts (the same argument expressed above about
why the Act's witness protection is flawed). 14 2 The National Association of Assistant United States Attorneys (NAAUSA) articulated this
view in a letter to the Honorable Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the
Congressional Committee on the Judiciary, and the Honorable Charles
Grassley, Ranking Minority Member of the same, dated June 4,
2012.143 In the letter, Robert Gay Guthrie begins by expressing that
the letter represents the opinion of 5600 Assistant United States
Attorneys (AUSAs) and requesting that his comments be included in the
June 6, 2012 hearing on disclosure requirements of federal prosecutors.'" He explains that the NAAUSA represents the attorneys who,
"day in and day out, fight for truth and justice to protect the innocent
and bring the guilty to the bar of justice." 45
Guthrie then explained the problems with the 2008 prosecution of
Senator Stevens, which have spurred the Act and many other reactions

140. Carl Lietz, Government Recycles Risk of DangerArgument To Convince Congress
To Reject Enactment of Fairnessin Disclosure of Evidence Act; Congress Should not be
Misled (Again)!, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWYER BLOG (June 28, 2012), httpJ/www.georgia
federalcriminallawyerblog.com/2012/06/governmentrecycles-risk-ofda-l.html.
One
author rejects this contention as relying on fear, not fact. See Jon May, Government's
Response to Brady Reform Relies on FearNot Fact,WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG (Jan.
25, 2012) http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecoUarcrime-blog/2012/06/goverments.
response-to-brady-reform-relies-on-fear-not-fact.htJl.
141. Lietz, supra note 140.

142. See May, supra note 140.

143. Letter from Robert Gay Guthrie to The Honorable Patrick Leahy, Chairman, as
well as The Honorable Charles Grassley, Ranking Minority Member (June 4, 2012),
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/resources/transcripts/upload/060612Record
Submission-Grassley.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
144. Id. at 1.
145.

Id.
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as well. 141 Not only does he acknowledge that the case generated
"considerable controversy" in regards the government's actions in that
case, it has also called into question the government's actions in all
47
He explains that the
federal, and even non-federal, criminal cases.
in many ways, and
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Guthrie explained that the special counsel that was appointed to
investigate turned over results that were "critically incomplete because
of limitations in the authority granted to the special counsel" by the
presiding judge.' l In short, the entire prosecution team was not fully
investigated, and blame was placed on the two initial AUSAs when2 those
The
problems, in reality, are also attributable to their supervisors."
was
Responsibility
Professional
Department of Justice's Office of
Professional
Department's
the
and
investigating at the same time,
5 3
clearly found that "whatever errors
Misconduct Review Unit"
5 4
Guthrie
occurred, they were made by team members as a whole."
not
were
they
occur,
clearly
did
pointed out that though mistakes
were
who
AUSAs
two
the
by
intentional and were not willfully made
punished, but instead the entire team was culpable.'
The problem with conduct, Guthrie explains, was not with "individual
5 6
He wrote, "[wie believe
misdeeds" but instead with "team lapses."
that the actions of these supervisory officials resulted in a series of
management decisions in the prosecution of the case that contributed to

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.

150. Id.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.

153. This is an entity created by the Attorney General to serve "as an adjudicatory unit
to resolve disciplinary matters such as the ones presented in the Stevens case." Guthrie,
supra note 143, at 2.
154. Guthrie, supra note 143, at 2.
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the ultimate disclosure violations."5I 7 The environment that the
AUSAs were working in was described in the letter as "hyper pressurized," and one in which "poor judgments, mistakes, and errors compounded one another and made it almost inevitable that disclosure
violations would occur."1"'
Guthrie then gets to the heart of his
argument: "While even a single instance of a prosecutor's failure to meet
the discovery obligations imposed by the law is one too many, claims of
widespread discovery abuse are simply not supported by the record."159
He goes on to detail the infrequency of misconduct: "[the Stevens
mistakes are not] the normal course of conduct by approximately 5,600
AUSAs across the country. In fact, the historical record speaks strongly
to the contrary. AUSAs consistently abide by their discovery obligations
to provide exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants." 6 ° The
statistics provided in the letter are even more telling: 800,000 cases
involving over one million defendants, but an "error" rate in a very small
portion, (0.0003) of cases. 161 In 2010, for example, only 26 of 68,591
criminal prosecutions involved discovery-related misconduct allegations,
an unknown number of which were dismissed or simply unfounded. 16 2
One reason the Department of Justice does not support the Act is
because it would alter the course of federal criminal discovery in an
unwarranted way. The letter argues, "[s]imilar proposals in the past
have originated and supported by the criminal defense bar," and other
largely-biased groups. 63 Yet simultaneously, courts from the highest
in the land down have been 'finely hon[ing]" duties and responsibilities
of federal prosecutors in the discovery process."
As the statistics
referenced above show, prosecutors have overwhelmingly complied, and
those isolated incidents where they have erred do not merit this
"overreaction" in the form of legislation. 16 5
The NAAUSA opposes the Act because it is "unwarranted and
risky." 166 The duty of an AUSA does not come from forced legislation
but "springs from his special role in our system of justice under the

157. Id.

158. Id. Guthrie makes sure to note that the supervisors, as part of the prosecutorial
team, were not punished for creating these conditions for the AUSAs. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2-3.
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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Constitution as the legal representative of the United States of
America. " 11 7 They understand that the duty to protect innocent people
and secure convictions for guilty people is at the heart of this ultimate
responsibility. Courts, not Congress, Guthrie argues, are the proper
place to determine the discovery responsibilities and obligations of each
party.'68 Recently the Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference
of the United States "reaffirmed that responsibility through its decision
to preserve the current language of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure." 169 This additional legislation is not only unnecessary, it is cumbersome and confusing in a process that is well-known and
understood. 7 °
The Act also will create harms that are not intended: endangering
witness privacy and safety; releasing potentially dangerous national
security-related information; increasing litigation over discovery issues
not substantially influencing a defendant's guilt; delayed justice; and
Guthrie argues that the
public uncertainty with criminal verdicts.'
problem that needs
systematic
a
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departure from
"significant
a
merit
remedying, and certainly does not
contributed to
have
that
practices
well-established criminal justice
providing
while
country,
this
in
crime
of
record reductions in the rates
172
law."
the
under
process
due
of
rights
basic
the
defendants with
The letter concludes by arguing that the current state of criminal
discovery law is not flawed, but the laws in place must simply be
followed.17 Since that case, the Department of Justice has certainly
taken several steps to prevent errors like that again: "All new AUSAs go
to 'Discovery Boot Camp', all AUSAs participate in various mandatory
yearly discovery training programs, and each United States Attorney's
Office is obligated to produce a Department-approved [ 'Discovery
Manual.'' 17' Because of the Stevens case, prosecutors are more-closely
watched and the Department is "redoubl[ing]" efforts to prevent future
violations. 175 The case itself and the media attention do not merit,
according to the NAAUSA, sweeping restructuring of the prosecutorial
discovery process and requirements. 76
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Another source from the Department of Justice further explains the
problems with the Act."17 This source is a letter to a ranking member
of the United States Committee on the Judiciary, the Honorable Charles
E. Grassley, from George J. Terwilliger III, a former U.S. Deputy
Attorney General.178 Terwilliger served as counsel for one of the chief
witnesses for the government in the Stevens case, as well as a U.S.
Attorney General during two administrations.' 79 He explains that "the
vast majority of federal prosecutors [are] professionals committed evenly
to both the cause of justice and to prosecuting those who are a threat to
public safety and integrity in our society."' 80 He articulates his overall
view of the Act as such: "although the proposed legislation has the
obvious good intent of promoting fairness[,] in .

..

its broad reach is

unnecessary and could do more harm than good. In sum, the legislation
would substitute a new statutory standard for a well understood existing
standard that has been well-defined by years of jurisprudence." 1"
He goes on to detail the specifics of the Stevens case and explains that
there was no problem with a misunderstanding of obligations there-the
problems occurred because the already well-established requirements for
disclosing exculpatory information were not met. 8 ' Thus, using the
Stevens case as a reason for a new standard does not make sense. This
is because the new standard, "by requiring disclosure without regard to

the materiality of information to guilt or punishment,... could permit

reversal of criminal convictions even where no harm resulted from a
disclosure error in trial proceedings."" Therefore, the new standard
would change the basis for appellate review of disclosure issues and thus
would "fix a legal standard that is neither broken nor inadequate.""
He then explains that a bright line rule like the one-size-fits-all
system the legislation creates results in problems unrecognized by the
proposal. 1" For example, disclosing the names of witnesses in cases

177. Letter from George J. Terwilliger, III to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley,
Ranking member, United States Senate (June 5, 2012), availableat http://www.judiciary
•senate.gov/resources/transcripts/upload/060612Recordsubmission.Grassley.pdf.
178. Mr. Terwilliger is a partner in the Washington D.C. office of White & Case LLP
and is a former United States Deputy Attorney General and acting United States Attorney
General. See Mr. Terwilliger's biography, availableat httpJ/www.morganlewis.com/bios/

gterwilliger.
179. Terwilliger, supra note 177, at 1.
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involving gangs or violent crimes could lead to less effective investigation
of crimes because such persons would be less likely to participate and
s
Footnote three in the letter explains
put their lives in jeopardy."
that the pending legislation "applies 'notwithstanding' 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(a),"187 a code section which protects the statements of witnesses for
the government from being disclosed until the witnesses have an
188
Because with this proposed legislaopportunity to testify on direct.
tion the government can move for an order preventing disclosure of
information "only if the infromation is impeachment evidence against a
potential witness and the government establishes a 'reasonable basis'"
for believing that there would be a threat to the witness's safety, with
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One of the major problems with the legislation is that it creates a gray
area where a clear rule currently stands under Brady. Terwilliger
explains that Brady and Giglio obligations are "well developed and []
clearly understood by the DOJ as a result of nearly fifty years of
191
The United States Attorneys' Manual
experience with the rule."
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all favorable evidence known to the government be disclosed, but instead
only the evidence, which, if omitted, "is of sufficient significance to result
in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial."195 Because of this,
it is required that the evidence had a reasonable probability of producing
a different verdict in order for there to be a Brady violation.
This is the most significant problem with the Act: the change in the
materiality and, therefore, the harmless error standard. As Terwilliger
explains, the proposed Act apparently requires disclosure of favorable
information regardless of the relevance or materiality of the information. 9 ' This Act is effectively requiring Congress to introduce new
rules for everyone involved in the federal criminal process: the courts,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys. 9 ' With the new rules, the fifty
years of developing precedent is undermined, as Terwilliger explains:
because the materiality standard of Brady is altered, the harmless error
standard for appeal of criminal discovery matters is also altered.' A
new standard like this could easily lead to reversals in cases where there
was no prejudice to the defendant even with the error-thus creating
greater judicial costs and delays at the trial court and "mini-trials"
regarding the government's discovery obligations.' 99
IV. BAD FACTS MAKE BAD LAW: A MORE RATIONAL SOLUTION

The solution to prosecutorial misconduct is not a broad, vague,
overreaching, reactionary change in laws. Legislation based on a mediainflated problem-making the Stevens case seem like the norm-is not
a prudent solution. As Terwilliger explains, "Itihe important question
in any effort to reform the government's disclosure obligations is not
whether sufficient standards exist (they do) or whether they are well
known by federal prosecutors (they are)," but whether the errors made
by prosecutors under those standards are able to be dealt with appropriately at trial by the court so that defendants can receive a fair trial. 200
The Court should not rely on new legislation to implement new
standards because doing so would not actually prevent misconduct from
occurring by prosecutors. Instead of more laws to prevent misconduct,
enforcement of currently sufficient standards is necessary. The

195. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976).
196. Terwilliger, supra note 177, at 3.

197. Id.

198. Id. See, e.g., Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 584 n.1 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[tjhe

materiality standard in traditional Brady claims supplants harmless-error review because
practically speaking, the two analyses are the same").
199. Terwilliger, supra note 177, at 3.
200. Id.
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Department of Justice has indeed begun to do so by holding supervisors
more responsible for all decision-making.2"' The case relied on for the
reactionary Act is actually an illustration of why proper training is a
better solution than new legislation. In the Stevens case, the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility and Special
Counsel Henry J. Schuelke, III, in the investigative report previously
mentioned, concluded that the prosecutors withheld information that
was very important to Senator Stevens's defense.2" 2 The investigative
report explained that the omissions by prosecutors happened in an
"environment where fundamental disclosure obligations got less than the
full attention and commitment of the trial team and supervisors that
they merit."2 °3 In that case, non-lawyer (and thus not as familiar with
Brady and Giglio precedent) investigators-FBI and IRS agents-were
at times relied upon to review government evidence by the Department
of Justice.0 4 The problems there were with performance issues that
new legislation will not correct-performance issues that can be
corrected by greater training and supervision.
There are many options, other than training, to remedy this problem
that are not a comprehensive overhaul of current practice. One way is
allowing defendants a greater opportunity for in camera review by the
courts. If defendants were only required to meet a low-threshold
standard if they expected that the prosecution was withholding
exculpatory information, that would keep the government aware that the
court could call forth that information. This would encourage more
thorough record-keeping without an unnecessary overhaul of current
precedent. This would keep the materiality standard and also the
harmless error standard intact. Generally speaking, prosecutors would
be even more likely to "err on the side of disclosure in marginal
circumstances. 2 05
There could also be a more intensive peer-review system set up within
the Department of Justice or individual United States Attorney Offices.
If the process were independent of prosecutors actually going to trial, it
would encourage a similar transparency in record-keeping while
providing a check for the effectiveness of training and supervisory roles
within each individual office. Investigative agencies could also be
further trained to identify information that is automatically flagged as
likely to be required for disclosure. All of these possible schemes present
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alternative solutions to the proposed Act that have much less unnecessary change of past precedent involved.
The other possible solution is to consider the version of the proposal
that the Judicial conference was considering within Rule 16. Under the
Murkowski bill, the prosecutor has to have a protective order to not
disclose a piece of evidence. Though the Judicial Center's Rule 16 version
of the proposal was stalled, pro'secutors could decide if they were not
going to turn over the evidence. The decision did, however, have to be
certified.
V.

CONCLUSION: EVALUATING BURDENS

This Comment aimed to discuss both supporters of the proposal and
those who think that the Act is not tailored to its conceived purpose. To
present these views, several groups with obvious interests were
presented, as well as those who are neutral on their faces. If one is
honest with his or her view of the Act itself-and gets into the language
that is presented-the Author thinks it is inevitable to view the Act as
an overshoot.
That said, there are many reasons a proposal could certainly intend
to overshoot its eventual purpose. Here, the language could be broad
and sweeping because the proposers expect the Act to go through several
line-by-line revisions that scrape and modify the Act into a piece of
legislation that becomes workable. The Act may also be presented as an
extreme that will encourage a more moderate proposal including more
tailored versions of the more burdensome obligations the Act included.
The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the Act on June 6,
2012, but it remains to be seen whether any further action will be
taken.20 6 There are many reasons to reject the Act; namely, it was
written as a reactionary measure in a case where greater training and
supervision would have solved the problem without the new overreaching standards the Act requires.
The proposal focuses too little on witness protection and is unnecessarily broad. Evidence unrelated to the outcome is required to be turned
over by the prosecutorial team, though unrelated evidence obviously
could not make a difference in the outcome for the defendant. A
materiality standard that is engrained in prosecutor and defense
attorney offices, and, of course, courts throughout the country, is
abandoned. The harmless error standard that appellate courts firmly

206. See Ensuring that Federal Prosecution Meet Discovery Obligations: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2012), availableat www.judiciary.sen
ate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfn?renderforprint= l&id=45bldd574all77ba092e43f19974eb99.
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rely on for discovery conduct questions is uprooted. The problem of
prosecutorial misconduct being inflated by the media is the impetus for
this proposal.
Instead, United States Attorney Offices should-and have-continue
to implement standards that encourage compliance with discovery
requirements. Prosecutors should be thoroughly trained and refreshed
on those standards. Strict supervision from inside-and possibly
outside, in the form of investigative bodies or neutral peer review-could
be implemented in its place. When manuals are developed by the offices
themselves, the day-to-day actions of prosecutors can be incorporated
more effectively. The harsh standards proposed by the Murkowsi bill
7
(like the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard" on appeal) are an
overreaction that looks to punish prosecutors and will create a system
of uneasiness and inefficiency. It will be very difficult for prosecutors to
prove their non-knowledge (or imputed knowledge, as the bill necessitates) regarding exculpatory information.
The scope of the imputation of knowledge to a prosecutor is also far
too broad to be acceptable or practical under our system. It is impossible
for every member of every prosecutorial team-a difficult entity to
define, as well-to be instantly responsible for the knowledge of
investigatory bodies that work with them. It is part of the nature of
criminal investigation that non-lawyers are often responsible for the
tools that prosecutors rely on, and often the tools that they are charged
with providing the defense.
To put the whole burden of disclosure on the prosecutor instantly by
creating a legal fiction that the prosecutor knows what every investigator knows in a case is to create an impossible compliance standard.
Instead, the individual government bodies, as well as courts, can create
better enforcement mechanisms when standards that are already in
place fail like they did in the Stevens case. When evidence is not
directly linked to the guilt of the accused, or evidence is immaterial to
a conviction is required to be turned over, prosecutors' offices are turned
into investigatory bodies that do not actually promote the adversarial
nature of our justice system.
Though it is certainly and unquestionably true that prosecutors should
turn over exculpatory evidence that will prevent a wrongful conviction,
this logical requirement is pushed to an illogical end when all information is required to be disclosed. Defense attorneys' roles would become,

207. This is a standard that really does not make sense considering the foundations of
our criminal justice system. This standard requires prosecutors to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that they are compliant with discovery requirements-that they are
innocent, in a way, of unethical conduct.
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instead of finding the best information to defend their client through
their own tools, an investigation of the actions of the prosecutor. In fact,
as the Act is currently written, defense attorneys might not be zealously
defending their client if they do not question whether all information-material or not, as required by the proposal-is given to them.
In conclusion, it is unlikely for this Act to make its way into federal
law.. But the compelling reasons against and effective solutions that
could, and are, replacing it provide ample reason to prevent shaking the
foundation of our federal criminal justice system's discovery rules, which
have been carefully laid by courts for the last five decades. The rules
have been carefully delineated by the judiciary to create enough
breathing room to ensure rightful and effective law enforcement at the
federal level, and though the belt certainly should be tightened in
situations like the Stevens case, a comprehensive and choking overhaul
is certainly not the answer. This Act is certainly a good lesson for the
old adage "bad facts can create bad law."
JACQUELYN SMITH

